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ABSTRACT
We consider the design of a low probability of intercept (LPI) half-duplex communica-
tions system in which the downlink is established via communications signals embedded
in a pulsed-radar Doppler waveform. Previous works suggest to embed the communica-
tions in the radar backscatter where it has been shown possible to recover and demodulate
communications signals that are coincident with the radar pulses in time and frequency
using quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) modulation. Unfortunately, such an approach
presents difficulty for a two-way link. In this work, we present a LPI half-duplex design
where the downlink communications are embedded in the radar transmission, while the up-
link may be transmitted via another covert method after the radar initiates communications.
We illustrate the downlink using binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), QPSK, eight phase-
shift keying (8PSK), quadrature-amplitude modulation (QAM), and explore a non-standard
8PSK for LPI. We show that probability of detection for the radar is actually improved by
correlating to the radar-downlink signal. We also show that the downlink is feasible via
symbol error rate (SER) results by estimating the radar signal parameters and subtracting
the radar waveform from the received signal prior to demodulation. Further, we explore
a qualitative analysis of this communications method to measure its covertness using the
signal’s complex plane.
v
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The world has used sea lanes of communications for centuries to move goods and ideas.
According to the InternationalMaritimeOrganization (IMO), we see that 90% of the world’s
trade takes place on the sea [1]. The large ships that transport these goods are required to
maintain situational awareness through a variety of sensors, especially radar. Rule 5 of the
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)
requires ships to "maintain a proper look-out by ... all means" [2]. For ease of piecing
together information from the data gathered, the radar is usually integrated into bridge
displays.
As we move through the information age, due to our voracious appetite for information,
pressures for communications capacity increase. The U.S. Navy and other entities use radio
frequency (RF) bandwidth for sensing the environment as well as for communications. In
this thesis, we explore a way to increase the communication capacity available by placing
the communications signal co-channel with a radar. We propose to embed communica-
tions within bandwidth already allocated to the radar, possibly without decreasing radar
performance.
In this thesis research, we continue the previous works [3], [4], [5], [6] conducted through
the Engineering Enclave for Maritime Cyber Security (EEMS) laboratory to understand
the maritime cyber environment. As such, it is appropriate to discuss the maritime cyber
terrain.
1.1 Maritime Cyber Terrain
Planners, when building a route, attempt to select the best route by studying a map. When
military planners want to cause an effect, they consider the maneuver space. The effects
are easy to conceptualize for physical terrain (land, air, sea, space); however, to obtain
understanding of cyber’s virtual terrain is more difficult. The cyber realm, while tied
to physical infrastructure, is arranged in data-link layers ranging from operating systems,
devices, applications, to routing information. A truck driver is tied to the road, but a cyber
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effect is tied to the data layer that moves the traffic. The trucker can choose a different road,
whereas the cyber effect can reshape the network. In order to gain understanding of the
cyber terrain, we must examine where vulnerabilities lie. Once found, we can determine
if these vulnerabilities can be mitigated. Within the maritime cyber terrain, ships float
with multiple connected networks that create a large attack surface. The attack surface
consists of the various ways these networks send and receive data: chart updates, automatic
identification system (AIS), global positioning system (GPS), navigational radar, weapons
control radar, and various other communications paths. When ships get underway and
communicate, the attack surface is dominated by radio frequency (RF) equipment [7].
Internal to a ship are multiple networks. There is a voyage network for planning and execut-
ing the ship’s transit, an engineering network to help administer and control the propulsion
plant, and a communications network for sending and receiving orders, coordinating with
other ships, and communicating to the outside world. There may be an entertainment
network for providing recreation as its own network or this may be a subset of the commu-
nications network. Few people understand the intersection of these networks. We think of
them as having some intersection, as displayed in Figure 1.1. Different shipboard networks
are displayed with the shared infrastructure (routers, switches, cabling, servers, computers,
communications paths) shown by the overlaps in the Venn diagram [7].
Companies are under economic pressure to minimize hardware while maximizing perfor-
mance characteristics. With our ever increasing need for information, data throughput is a
key performance characteristic. This pressure causes reuse of cyber infrastructure aboard
ship as shown in Figure 1.2. Some of the reasons that increased communications capacity
is needed are illustrated in Figure 1.2. These reasons include remote monitoring of engi-
neering systems, real-time maritime traffic data, and other specialized data requirements.
As [8] states, "sensors and onboard equipment help lower costs, and improve productivity."
Clearly there are business pressures to increase connectivity within the ship.
With commercial pressures to aggregate data to support business planning and engineer-
ing troubleshooting, it is unsurprising that there are news stories [9], [10] discussing the
possibility of subverting the maritime cyber terrain for nefarious purposes.
Understanding both the inter-ship and intra-ship topology is crucial to grasp the maritime
cyber terrain. To illuminate one portion of this field, we choose radar systems as our focus.
2
Figure 1.1. A Logical Layout of How Various Shipboard Networks Overlap.
Adapted from [7].
Most ships are equipped with radar, and the radar is connected to the voyage network.
1.1.1 Embedded Communications
In order tomeet the increasing demand for data throughput within the limits of the frequency
spectrum already assigned, we propose to embed the communications signal within the radar
pulse. Through embedding, we create a covert channel. This radar signal with embedded
communications is the focus of this thesis work. The possible path for radar to affect the
network, or to communicate, is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The steps necessary to take data
embedded in RF energy to data bits traveling on a shipboard network are diagrammed in
Figure 1.3. In this work, we explore the specifics of pulse detection, radar estimation and
subtraction, and demodulation to discrete communications symbols.
Previous work has focused on embedding a communications signal in the backscatter of
a radar pulse [3]–[6], [11], [12] in either a cooperative or non-cooperative manner. We
now examine embedding and detecting communications symbols within the radar pulses
from the actual radar emitter instead of the backscatter. The difference between this design
and previous works is illustrated in Figure 1.4, where, in the left panel, previous works
suggested to embed data link symbols onto the radar backscatter from STA-2. STA-1 then
3
Figure 1.2. A Graphic Developed for the Maritime Industry Displaying Their
View of a Ship's Interconnected Networks. Source: [8].
demodulates the communications signal. On the right panel, the downlink of embedded
symbols is implemented by the radar transmitter on STA-1 and uplink is established during
the OFF time of the radar return using direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) from STA-2.
In Figure 1.4, the radar signals and their returns are colored blue, while the DSSS signal
is colored red. In the both panels, signals carrying communications are dashed lines and
un-embedded signals are solid lines. No backscatter is shown in the right panel.
In the previous works mentioned, data transmission was limited to embedding within the
radar backscatter and only provided one side of a communications link. There are some
practical issues with this approach. Radar signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is typically large
to ensure both robust probability of detection and stringent probability of false alarm. In
order to demodulate embedded communications, an increased SNR is required for further
4
Figure 1.3. Flow Diagram Showing the Logical Steps Needed to Take a RF
Signal and Convert it to Data Bits Traveling on the Maritime Network.
Figure 1.4. Two Dierent Proposed Data Link Congurations Between Sta-
tions. Adapted from [5].
separation between the data symbols and noise to ensure meeting symbol error ratio (SER)
requirements. Further, synchronizing the embedded data link symbols to the backscatter
would be prohibitively difficult; both the hardware and software needed for radar estimation
and coherent embedded synchronization would be extensive.
In this work, we investigate embedding the data link symbolswithin the radar pulses from the
actual radar emitter instead of the backscatter. A benefit of this technique is that we can take
advantage of the additional energy provided by the data symbols to potentially improve radar
probability of detection (PD) by correlating to the new radar-communications waveform
instead of just the radar pulses. This would not have been possible with the backscatter
case, as the radar would have no a priori knowledge of the embedded data.
While previous work focused on quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK), differential phase-
shift keying (DPSK), differential quadrature phase-shift keying (DQPSK), and non-coherent
differential quadrature phase-shift keying (NC-DQPSK) [3]–[6], we expand the modulation
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schemes to include binary phase-shift keying (BPSK), eight phase-shift keying (8PSK),
a modified 8PSK, and quadrature-amplitude modulation (QAM). Generally, throughout
this thesis, we assume the communications signal’s presence is obscured by its power in
comparison to the significantly stronger radar signal instead of through other means. We use
the radar-to-communications ratio (RCR) to describe the power of the radar signal relative
to the embedded communications signal. We use the communications signal-to-noise ratio
(C-SNR) to specify the power of the communications signal relative to the noise.
1.2 Covertness Evaluation
Previous work focused on evaluating radar-embedded communications impact to radar
performance via plan position indicator (PPI) display [4]. We test our modulation schemes
to determine their noticeability on a PPI. We analyze the covertness of the embedded
signal by examining the phase plane (complex plane) of the received signal as seen by an
eavesdropper on the STA-1 to STA-2 conversation. We assume that the eavesdropper is
capable of the following: estimating the radar signal parameters, subtracting the radar from
its received signal, and observing the phase plane of the residual signal. We assume that the
non-cooperative eavesdropper is separately located from STA-2 and determine if it could
detect the covert communications channel.
Previous work also examined at the effects on PD with embedding in the backscatter [3].
The work in [4] found power spectral density (PSD) and range Doppler maps (RDM) are
minimally impacted by backscatter embedding.
1.3 Objective
The discussion above motivates the investigation into establishing a half-duplex communi-
cations path. We explore two measures of performance. First, we measure the performance
of the radar as a function of PD. We test the PD of match-filtered radar with and without
embedded communications. Second, we explore the SER of the downlink to quantify the
quality of the communications channel.
The proceeding sections also motivate an inquiry into the covertness of the embedded radar
signal. We qualify covert communications through both the PPI display available to a radar
operator and through the complex plane as viewed by an eavesdropper away from STA-2.
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We conduct our investigation of the data-embedded radar channel in software using MAT-
LAB and in hardware using Simulink and System Generator with a field programmable
gate array (FPGA).
1.3.1 Thesis Organization
We organize the rest of the thesis in the followingmanner. In Chapter 2, we explore previous
research in the area of co-channel radar and communications signals. We also present the
mathematical models used for the radar and communications signals. The experimental
methodology, detection, and demodulation techniques are discussed in Chapter 3. Results
are presented in Chapter 4. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for future work are
presented in Chapter 5.
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In this chapter, we present the signal models necessary to mathematically represent radar,
communications, and noise. We also discuss the various modulations used to embed the
data into the radar waveform.
2.1 Signal Definitions
Adapted from previous works such as [3], [4] and [6], we assume a complex envelope signal
model such that the signal transmitted from the radar antenna is y(t) = r(t) + q(t) where
r(t) is the radar signal and q(t) is the communications signal that "hides" within the radar
pulse. Some amount of noise w(t) is added within the receiver. We assume this noise
is zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Upon receipt and analog-to-digital
(A/D) sampling, signal processing occurs. We use sufficiently high sampling rates to avoid
aliasing. Additionally, we assume normalized sampling time where TS = 1; therefore, the
model of the received signal is
y[n] = r[n] + q[n] + w[n], (2.1)
where the discrete-time sample index is n = 0, 1, 2, .... The radar can be either continuous
wave (CW) or pulsed Doppler (PD). For this work, we concentrate on PD radars; thus,
in the actual radar emission, we only embed the data symbols within the ON time of the







un[n − kTr], (2.2)
where Ar is the amplitude of the radar signal and φr is the phase of the radar pulse, which
is assumed to be constant for the duration of that transmission. We note that in general,
the phase may be different from pulse to pulse. That extension was previously addressed in
[3]. The rectangular pulse train is represented by
∑K−1
k=0 un[n− kTr] and consists of K pulses
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(u[n] − u[n − tp]), (2.3)
where u[n] is the unit step function and tp is the time duration of the radar pulse. If
Ar = 1, it follows that the pulse train described in Equation (2.2) is of unit energy; thus,
Ar is the parameter we use to scale the radar signal energy for a particular radar SNR. The
communications signal is modulated with either a modified PSK signal or a QAM signal.
The modified phase-shift keying (PSK) signal has the same amplitude for each symbol;
however, the QAM symbols are separated in both phase and amplitude. A mean magnitude







where M = 16 for 16QAM. The amplitude of the communications symbols is set by the
power ratio of the radar signal and embedded communications signal, defined as the radar-
to-communications ratio, or RCR = Pr/Pq. The power of the radar and communications
signals are denoted by Pr and Pq, respectively. Since the communications signal is only







If Aq = 1, then the waveform described by Equation (2.4) is of unit energy; thus, Aq serves to
scale the energy desired for this communications signal. It was shown in previous work that
RCR does not affect SER significantly. Nevertheless, since our assumption is large RCR,
we set RCRdB to 20 dB in some portions of this work and for our Monte Carlo simulations.
We need a measure for howmany communications symbols we attach to a given radar pulse.
Following the convention established by [4], we choose the symbol rate-to-bandwidth ratio
(SRBR). We define the symbol rate RS as the reciprocal of the symbol duration Ts. Per







We vary SRBR between 1, 4, and 32 symbols per pulse in this work. The symbols are
modulated as discussed in Section 2.2.
While not directly studied in this work, the act of embedding a communications signal into













A by-product of enlarging the symbol rate is a possible range resolution improvement for
the radar.
2.2 Communications Signals
In this section, the methods for selecting a communications symbol and constructing the
communications signal are discussed. We start with basic signals, then add complexity
through the different modulation schemes.







Aq[k]e jφq[k]uc[n − kTr], (2.9)
where φq[k] is the phase of the communications symbol, Aq[k] is the amplitude of the
communications symbol, and uc[n] is defined the same as un[n] in Equation (2.3). In this
equation, there is one symbol per pulse, but multiple symbols are easily accommodated in
our simulations. If Aq = 1, then the signal described by Equation (2.9) is of unit energy;
thus, we can use Aq to set the energy for the communications signal.
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2.2.1 BPSK




. As is true
for all phase-shift keying symbols, data is encoded by the change in phase.
2.2.2 QPSK
For the QPSK signal, the symbols are again randomly drawn from the set φq ∈{
π/4, 3π/4, 5π/4, 7π/4
}
. With the inclusion of two additional phase changes over BPSK, the
amount of bits sent per symbol is twice that of BPSK.
2.2.3 8PSK
For the 8PSKsignal, the symbols are a randomdraw from the set φq ∈
{
π/4, 2π/4, 3π/4, 4π/4, 5π/4,
6π/4, 7π/4, 8π/4
}
. The increase to eight phases increases the bit rate to three times that of BPSK.
2.2.4 Modified 8PSK
For the modified 8PSK signal, the symbols are a random draw from the set φq ∈{
7π/36, 11π/36, 25π/36, 29π/36, 43π/36, 47π/36, 61π/36, 65π/36
}
. The phase map for this odd modu-
lation is visualized in Figure 2.1. The blue circles represent each of the eight symbols in
Figure 2.1, while the noise corrupted symbols appear as open orange circles. As with the
unmodified 8PSK, three bits of information are sent with each symbol. The received signal
constellation can be easily mistaken for QPSK, granting it a low probability of intercept
(LPI) quality.
2.2.5 QAM
The previous work of [3]–[6], concentrated on PSK modulation schemes. We now extend
the research to include forms of amplitude modulation (AM). The symbols for the standard
16QAM are a random draw from the set
{
− 3 − 3 j,−3 − j,−3 + j,−3 + 3 j,−1 − 3 j,−1 −
j,−1 + j,−1 + 3 j, 3 − 3 j, 3 − j, 3 + j, 3 + 3 j, 1 − 3 j, 1 − j, 1 + j, 1 + 3 j
}
. Notice that we
can normalize the average energy of all the 16 possible constellation symbols; thus, we
can easily arrive at the desired energy (when setting the SNR in our simulations) by using
the average magnitude in Equation (2.4) to form the desired energy. With a choice of 16
possible values for each symbol, four bits of data can be sent with each symbol.
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Figure 2.1. Phase Constellation for Modied 8PSK with Noise (SNR=5 dB).
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CHAPTER 3:
Detection and Demodulation Techniques
In order to sense the environment, we must detect and interpret radar-return pulses. The
PD for a radar is a function of the SNR and the probability of false alarm (PFA). Similarly
for communications, the symbol transmitted must be demodulated by the receiver. In this
chapter, we first explore the detection of the radar pulse. We then examine constructing and
using an estimator of the radar signal such that we can recover the communications signal
q[n]. Next we examine the demodulation of the residual communications signal. Finally,
we examine the covertness of the combined radar/communications signal y[n] using the
PPI radar display and the complex plane of y[n].
3.1 Radar Detection
In order for STA-2, the receiver as displayed in Figure 1.4, to recognize that STA-1 has sent
data, it must detect the radar pulse. This classic detection problem is discussed in [14]. The
problem is as follows:
H0 : x[n] = w[n]
H1 : x[n] = r[n] + w[n] (3.1)
for n = 0, 1, ..., N̂ − 1, where N̂ is the number of samples. The null hypothesis (H0) is the
hypothesis that there is only noise present, while the alternate hypothesis (H1) is that there
is a signal present. To determine which choice to make, a test statistic is determined such
that the PFA is met. For this work we used PFA = 0.001. We choose H1 if 1/N̂
∑N̂−1
n=0 x[n]
is greater than the threshold (γ). Following [14], we calculate γ as
√
σ2ε/2Q−1(PF A), with
σ2 as the noise variance, ε as the signal energy, and Q−1(•) is the inverse Q-function.









The Q-function is denoted by Q(•) [14].
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3.2 Estimation
As discussed in [5], we use an estimator of various sizes N to estimate the magnitude and
phase of the radar pulse r[n] at STA-2’s receiver. We let r = Ar e jφr and 1 is a column vector
of N ones. Similarly, we letq =
[
q[0], q[1], ..., q[N−1]
]T and y = [y[0], y[1], ..., y[N−1]]T ,
where T indicates the transpose. The radar signal’s least squares error (LSE) (J(r̂)) is of
the form
J(r̂) = ‖y − (r1 + q)‖2. (3.3)
When the radar power is much greater than the communications power, Equation (3.3) can
be approximated by
J(r̂)  ‖y − r1‖2. (3.4)







The magnitude estimate is found by taking the absolute value of Equation (3.5). The angle
is found by taking the arctangent of the imaginary part of r̂ divided by the real part of r̂ .
One can see that the estimator improves as more terms are considered, i.e., by increasing N .
Because N is critical to the estimate, we parameterize N in our Monte Carlo simulations to
observe the effect of estimator size on SER. Once an estimate is determined, that estimate
is subtracted from the received signal and is given by
q̂ = y − r̂1. (3.6)
The vector q̂ is then demodulated through a maximum-likelihood detector (MLD) to de-
termine the received data signal. Because 16QAM, 8PSK, and the modified 8PSK are
more closely spaced than QPSK, larger estimator sizes than that utilized in [3] are used
to produce better SER results. We employed N ∈
{
0, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, full signal length
}
in this research. The case of N = 0 simply means that no estimator is used. For N = full
signal length, every discrete signal value is included in the estimator. In the succeeding
results, full signal length varies from 300 to 30,000. As N increases, so does the signal
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processing time. In other words, for real-time applications N has to be a practical number.
For real-time or near real-time communications, N needs to be chosen for an acceptable
SER versus the processing delay.
3.3 Communications Demodulation
After detection and estimation, the communications signal undergoes demodulation. We
use a MLD consisting of a bank of filters matched for each symbol to attempt to determine
the correct symbol sent. We implement the MLD based on the a priori knowledge of
the modulation scheme under test. The filter returning the highest value is chosen as the
symbol; i.e., if filter R1 (corresponding to symbol 1) returns the highest value, then symbol
1 is chosen.
We set the simulations such that the receiver does not know a priori the power, phase, or
duration of the signal. We do this to test the end-to-end capability of the system, i.e, from
pulse detection to demodulation.
3.4 Hardware Implementation of Detection and Demodu-
lation
It has been shown previously that a FPGA achieves comparable SER results to that of the
mathematical model [5] when applied to continuous wave radars. We now include FPGA
detection of the radar pulse to the demodulation of the communications signal. Program-
ming the FPGA was conducted graphically using the Xilinx blockset inside MATLAB’s
SIMULINK environment. The logical flow for hardware implementation is depicted in
Figure 3.1.
The Xilinx Kintex 7 FPGA board used in this research is pictured in Figure 3.2. The FPGA
has both an Ethernet and Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) connection to interface with
MATLAB’s Simulink environment. Both the hardware implementation and the Simulink
model use the same input signal. This allows us to verify the Simulink model with hardware
and test for any differences between software and hardware.
We conducted three co-simulations. All three used N = 64 with communications signal-
to-noise ratio (C-SNR) of 10 dB and RCR of 20 dB. The correlation process and eventual
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Figure 3.1. Creation, Detection, Estimation, Demodulation Procedure for
FPGA Implementation. Adapted from [3].
detection were carried out through the use of matched filters as seen in Figure 3.3. The
maximum of the output of the filters indicates the index [n] that corresponds to the length of
the signal. The output of the matched-filters can then be used to trigger the demodulation
after estimation subtraction. We first demodulated a BPSK signal embedded in a pulsed-
Doppler radar waveform. Themodel is shown in Figure 3.4. On the left of themodel a BPSK
signal generator constructs the BPSK-radar-noise signal that is passed to both the Simulink
model and FPGA. The right most section contains the blocks demodulating the signals from
the pure Simulink model and the FPGA ("BPSK Demodulator Baseband"). We compared
these two bit streams to check for any differences in the results of the models. The second
test is the detection and demodulation of a QPSK signal embedded in a pulsed-Doppler
radar waveform. The model is visually represented in Figure 3.5. Following a layout
similar to the BPSK case, the far left is the QPSK-radar signal generator. Demodulation
and comparison occurs on the right portion of the model. The final co-simulation model
tests the 16QAM embedded in a pulse Doppler radar waveform. The model is laid out as
shown in Figure 3.6. The model maintains the same logical flow, signal generation is on
the left, demodulation is on the far right, and estimation-subtraction is in the middle.
3.5 Communications Covertness
We now attempt different methods of qualifying the signal’s covertness. We conducted this
investigation through the use of the radar’s visual display and the complex plane. For both




























































































































































































































































Figure 3.7. Graphical Depiction of the PPI Scope of a Radar. Source: [16].
that the communications signal is low-powered compared to the radar signal.
3.5.1 Plan Position Indicator
In this section, we see if a radar operator looking at the PPI display is able to determine the
presence of a communications signal co-channel with the radar. This common radar display
depicts the radar pulse return in polar coordinates as a function of range and bearing. The
video displayed post signal processing is usually from an energy detector [15] as shown in
Figure 3.7.
We then attempt to construct a virtual terrain and display it on the PPI. We qualitatively
conclude if a signal is covert or not if it can be separated from the terrain.
3.5.2 Exploring the Complex Plane
In this section, we consider a situation where a non-cooperative receiver (STA-3) eavesdrops
on the conversation between STA-1 and STA-2. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.8. We
examine the complex plane of the signal observed at STA-3. We see if the communications
signal is discernable by considering the in-phase and quadrature (I/Q) components of the
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signal. If the communications signal within the radar signal is to remain covert, we prefer the
appearance of random points within the complex plane to be centered around the position of
the radar pulse. We note that the noise power at the receiver is different at STA-2 and STA-3
due to differences in receiver sensitivities driven by differing bandwidth requirements. The
signal power at each station is also different because of the different path lengths and effects
between STA-2 and STA-3. We note that STA-3 could be receiving the signal via STA-1
antenna’s sidelobe, reducing signal power. All of these effects indicate that there will be a
difference in C-SNR between STA-2 and STA-3. Due to position and sidelobe reception,
STA-3 will most likely operate at a disadvantage as is standard in classical LPI scenarios.
In Figure 3.9, we show an arbitrary radar pulse without communications embedding. The
signal was sent with a phase of π/4 and a SNR of 30 dB. The amplitude of each open blue
circle is a discrete sample of the radar pulse and is distorted by noise from the ideal. The
radar phase actually rotates through the complex plane as it travels to reach a receiver and
will be a fixed but unknown quantity which must be estimated. In the complex plane, the
appearance of a deterministic structure centered around the radar’s phase plot estimate may
indicate embedded data. The signal changes phase as the distance between the transmitter
and receiver changes and the carrier signal changes phase. If the data is QPSK, the complex
plane without noise is shown in Figure 3.10. Using the subtraction method discussed in
Section 3.2, we can remove an estimate of the radar signal from the received signal, as
in Equation (3.6). By removing the radar estimate, any remaining structure of the signal
may be observable. Through estimation and subtraction, the complex plane for each of the
various data embedded radar signals is centered around the origin.
In the next chapter, we examine the results of these detection and demodulation techniques.
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Figure 3.8. A Scenario with an Uncooperative Receiver Eavesdropping on
the Conversation Depicted in Figure 1.4.
Figure 3.9. Graphical Depiction of a Constant Phase Radar Signal in the
Presence of Noise.
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Figure 3.10. Graphical Depiction of In-phase and Quadrature Axes for a
QPSK Signal. Source: [17].
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In this chapter, we explore the findings of ourwork. Wefirst quantify our PD results. We then
follow this with our simulated SER for the modulation schemes outlined in Section 2.2. We
next examine the results of our hardware co-simulation. Finally, we close this chapter with
qualitative results on the covertness of the communications within the radar-data signals.
4.1 Probability of Detection
When using matched filter detection matched to the radar pulse only, an embedded commu-
nications signal as proposed in [5] and [6] degrades the probability of detection as shown
in [4]. In this work, we embed the communications signal in the transmitted pulse and can,
therefore, coherently detect the radar return with the unique waveform sent. The additional
energy included in the transmitted waveform eliminates the PD degradation and now serves
to increase the PD. This effect is seen most at lower RCRs. In this section, we compare
three PD curves for various RCRs. The PD curves from the theoretical expression for
radar-pulse-only are shown as the solid blue lines in the ensuing figures. The PD curves
resulting from the radar-pulse-only matched filter on the radar-communications signal are
shown as the dashed red lines. Finally, the PD curves for radar-communications matched
filter detection are shown as the solid black lines.
The PD comparison is most easily seen in Figure 4.1, where the detection curve for a
communications embedded pulse using radar-pulse-only filter is slightly degraded compared
to the theoretical PD curve for radar-only signal except for low SNR. In this case, notice that
the radar and communications signals have equal energy; i.e., RCR = 0 dB and the SRBR =
4. We realize approximately 3 dB of gain over the theoretical PD through matched-filtered
detection of the communications-radar signal. Across all SNRs, the communications-radar
matched filtered case shows increased PD over the theoretical curve due to the increased
energy and matched-filtering.
It is unlikely that the signal will be sent with RCR = 0 dB as shown in Figure 4.1, as that
negates our LPI assumption. For the assumption in Equation (3.4), the communications-
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Figure 4.1. Comparison of Theoretical, Radar-Pulse-Only Matched Filter,
and the Radar-Communications Matched Filtered PD Curves versus SNR for
RCR = 0 dB.
radar signal will be sent with higher RCRs. In Figure 4.2, we present the theoretical PD
for the radar-only signal (blue line), PD using radar-only matched filter (dashed red line),
and the PD of matched filter to combined radar-data signal (solid black line) for the cases
of RCR = [3, 6, 10] dB with a SRBR of 4. A few observations are seen in Figure 4.2.
First, PD for communications-radar pulse matched filtered detection is always greater than
the theoretical PD for radar-pulse-only signal and the PD for the radar-only matched filter.
Second, as RCR increases, the PD advantage decreases. Finally, as RCR increases, the PD
of both the radar-only matched filtered case and the radar-communications matched filtered
case appear to converge to the theoretical PD. As less communications energy is added
to the pulse, the PD of the embedded communications-radar pulse decreases but is clearly
better than the other two curves.
4.2 Symbol Error Ratio
Themetric for the embedded communications performance is SER. To produce SER results,
we performMonte Carlo (MC) simulations by tracking the number of symbol errors divided
by the total number of symbols sent. We track the errors for each particular SNR to determine
the SER at that SNR. We perform 105 or 106 MC trials for each communications signal-to-
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Figure 4.2. Comparison of Theoretical, Radar-Pulse-Only Matched Filter,
and the Radar-Communications Matched Filtered PD Curves versus SNR for
RCR = [3, 6, 10] dB.
noise ratio (C-SNR). The choice between 105 or 106 MC trials is based off producing smooth
SER curves. Here, we initially simulate the case where we make no attempt to estimate the
radar signal parameters (N=0). Then we simulate the cases where N = [8, 16, 32, 64, 128,
full signal length]. In our simulations, "N = full signal length" corresponds to using each
discrete sample of the signal. For modified 8PSK and 16QAM, full signal length is 300
samples. BPSK’s full signal length is 30, 000. QPSK’s and 8PSK’s full signal length is
10, 000. In all cases, when there is no attempt to estimate the radar parameters and subtract
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Figure 4.3. SER Performance of BPSK as a Function of the Size of the
Estimator (N).
it from the received signal prior to demodulation, notice that the SER is unacceptably
poor. We also notice that as N increases, we obtain a better radar estimate, and SER
decreases for all modulations under test. This result is consistent with theory [18]. In
order to compare a communications-only channel to the radar-embedded communications
channel, we include a "SER no radar" curve, where "SER no radar" is the SER curve for
the communications-only channel.
4.2.1 BPSK
The SER curves for BPSK are shown in Figure 4.3 with 3 · 1010 samples per SNR. Using
106 MC trials, we show the SER curves for the differing estimator sizes (N = 0, 8, 16, 32,
64, 128, and 30,000). As N increases, SER improves as expected. The N = 10,000, or
full-signal length case, is only slightly worse than the communications-only channel, and
the results for these cases are very similar. Indeed the two curves lie on top of one another
in Figure 4.3.
4.2.2 QPSK
Our results for QPSK verify the work of [3]–[6]. We conducted 105 MC trials, of 109
samples per SNR with results shown in Figure 4.4. All of the SER curves decrease with
increasingC-SNR, as expected. For theQPSKmodulation, the full-signal lengthwas 10, 000
symbols. The full-signal length case is only slightly worse than the communications-only
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Figure 4.4. SER Performance of QPSK as a Function of the Size of the
Estimator (N).
channel and the results for these cases are very similar. Indeed, the two curves lie on top of
one another in Figure 4.4.
4.2.3 8PSK
For 8PSK, we again utilized 105 MC trials, with 109 samples per SNR and results shown
in Figure 4.5. The results are consistent with our general findings of PSK signals; as N
increases, the SER decreases. For the 8PSK modulation, the full-signal length was 10, 000
symbols.
4.2.4 Modified 8PSK
For the modified 8PSK, we utilized 106 MC trials, with 3 · 108 samples per SNR. The
modified 8PSK has a degraded SER compared to ideal 8PSK as expected, even with
increasing estimator sizes. The degraded SERs are shown in Figure 4.6. This is due to
the closeness of the symbols in the complex plane. For very large N , the resulting SER
approaches the theoretical SER of modified 8PSK only (as is the case where the radar power
is zero). For the modified 8PSK modulation, a full-signal length of 300 symbols was used.
This type of modulation is an option in the trade space of SER and LPI. If only modest
SER is required, then this modulation may be acceptable. If decreased SER is needed,
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Figure 4.5. SER Performance of 8PSK as a Function of the Size of the
Estimator (N).
then further separation of symbols in the constellation plane is required or forward error
correction may be implemented.
4.2.5 16QAM
We utilized 106 MC trials for 16QAM with 3 · 108 samples per SNR. The SER curves are
shown in Figure 4.7, where as N increases, SER decreases. Also shown in Figure 4.7,
as with all the other SER curves, as C-SNR increases, SER decreases. For the modified
16QAM modulation, the full-signal length was 300 symbols.
4.3 Hardware Results
Using the models shown in Section 3.4, we demodulated BPSK, QPSK, and 16QAM
signals. The results of hardware co-simulation show that the Simulink model and FPGA
model produce the same results. For each of these three modulations, 64 symbols were sent
with RCR = 20 dB and C-SNR = 10 dB.
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Figure 4.6. SER Performance of Modied 8PSK as a Function of the Size
of the Estimator (N).
4.3.1 FPGA Model performance
For the 64 symbols sent within the PRIs tested, there is no measurable difference in output
between implementation methods. This gives greater confidence to our software models.
Due to time constraints, we were unable to implement communications estimation and
demodulation synchronized off the detection of the embedded radar pulse. Because we
were unable to trigger demodulation following detection, we did not attempt MC trials to
determine FPGA SERs.
With a difference of exactly zero between the FPGA and software model outputs, we choose
the Simulink output to display our results. In Figure 4.8, we see the output of the BPSK
demodulator. The demodulator converts the complex plane representation of the symbol
to the symbol number. We can easily see where the signal is temporally located within the
trace. The value shown on the y-axis is the demodulated symbol, either a 0 or a 1. The
x-axis shows the normalized sampling time TS. The flat lines show the portion of time when
no signal is present. The rapid change seen around t = 64 is the change from one symbol to
another. We can see the QPSK demodulated signal in Figure 4.9. Again, we can see where
the signal is located in time within the trace. Only one symbol is sent during each sample,
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Figure 4.7. SER Performance of Modied 16QAM as a Function of the Size
of the Estimator (N).
Figure 4.8. The BPSK Simulink and FPGA Waveforms over Time.
and the value of the demodulated symbol (0, 1, 2, or 3) is shown on the y-axis. Finally, in
Figure 4.10 we see output of the 16QAM demodulator. We again see where the data signal
is located within the trace. While we were unable to trigger the estimation process through
pulse detection, we have shown that symbols can be received and processed in a FPGA.
4.4 Covertness Analysis
We now turn our attention to the qualitative measure of the concealment of the data within
the radar pulse. First we examine the PPI display available to the radar operator. Then we
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Figure 4.9. The QPSK Simulink and FPGA Waveforms over Time.
Figure 4.10. The 16QAM Simulink and FPGA Waveforms over Time.
explore the complex plane maps of the embedded pulse following the estimator. For this
section, we maintained an RCR of 20 dB.
4.4.1 Plan Position Indicator Display
For this qualitative result, we look at two figures of the same simulated terrain. The terrain is
shown in yellow, while the sea is shown in blue. The display is typical of what is seen on the
radar scopewhile operating near a coastline. Any "yellow" pixels seen in the blue "water" are
due to noise in our simulations. These false detections appear with a predictable regularity
based on the chosen PFA of the simulation. While many simulations were conducted, the
results differed little. Communications symbols were embedded within the radar signal
used to produce the PPI display seen in Figure 4.11. Communications symbols were not
embedded within the radar signal used to produce the PPI display shown in Figure 4.12.
When presented with these two images, it is unlikely one would notice the effects of the
change in waveform.
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Figure 4.11. View of the PPI Display Available to a Radar Operator Viewing
Embedded Covert Communications.
Figure 4.12. View of the PPI Display Available to a Radar Operator Viewing
a Radar Signal with No Embedded Communications.
4.4.2 LPI Analysis via Complex Plane Mapping
We now turn to the complex plane of the communications-radar signal. Recall that in
this case, we consider the case where the eavesdropper (STA-3) listens to the STA-1 to
STA-2 conversation. We qualitatively observe embedded information and see if we identify
regularities within the complex plane. Because we were only testing the covertness of each
modulation scheme and were not interested in real-time demodulation, we used the largest
estimator size N available. As discussed in Section 3.5.2, we note that since STA-3 is the
eavesdropper, its SNR is most likely worse than STA-2. But if its sensitivity approaches that
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Figure 4.13. The Complex Plane View after Estimator Subtraction of BPSK
Signal for C-SNR = [0, 5, 10, 15] dB.
of the intended receiver, its SNR increases. As the SNR increases, the embedding is more
obvious. We maintain a RCR of 20 dB for the results presented in this section. With the
notable exception of the modified 8PSK, all the signals appear as expected in the complex
plane.
BPSK
Depictions of 1000 random BPSK symbols for each C-SNR 0, 5, 10, and 15 dB are shown
in Figure 4.13. The BPSK embedded signal at C-SNR = 0 dB appears as if the radar signal
is subject to random noise. If the eavesdropper is indeed at a disadvantage, then a C-SNR
= 0 dB (at its receiver) is a good covert case from the perspective of the intended receiver;
however, as the C-SNR increases, the symbols become more distinct. Even at C-SNR as
low as 5 dB, two separate clusters can be seen.
QPSK
Depictions of 1000 randomQPSK symbols for each C-SNR 0, 5, 10, and 15 dB are shown in
Figure 4.14. The QPSK embedded signal at C-SNR = 0 dB appears as if the radar signal is
subject only to random noise; however, as the C-SNR increases, more order appears within
the signal. At C-SNR = 5 dB, we can discern edges in the complex plane. By C-SNR =
10 dB the clusters expected for a QPSK signal are unmistakable. The large C-SNR case
implies a receiver comparable to that of the intended receiver.
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Figure 4.14. The Complex Plane View after Estimator Subtraction of QPSK
Signal for C-SNR = [0, 5, 10, 15] dB.
Figure 4.15. The Complex Plane View after Estimator Subtraction of 8PSK
Signal for C-SNR = [0, 5, 10, 15] dB.
8PSK
Depictions of 1000 random 8PSK symbols for each C-SNR 0, 5, 10, and 15 dB are shown
in Figure 4.15. The 8PSK embedded signal at C-SNR of 0 dB and 5 dB appears as if the
radar signal is subject to only random noise; however, as the C-SNR increases, the phases
of the become more distinct. At C-SNR = 10 dB we can distinguish a clear annulus, with
the eight distinct phases visible at C-SNR = 15 dB.
Modified 8PSK
Depictions of 1000 randommodified 8PSK symbols for each C-SNR 0, 5, 10, and 15 dB are
shown in Figure 4.16. The modified 8PSK embedded signal at C-SNR = 0 dB appears as
if the radar signal is subject only to random noise; however, as the C-SNR increases, more
order appears within the system. At C-SNR = 5 dB, we can discern edges in the complex
plane. By C-SNR = 15 dB, the clusters we expect for a QPSK signal are unmistakable.
Even when this modified signal is found, it appears as QPSK. This adds another layer of
covertness and increases the LPI quality of this signal. When viewing this signal in the
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Figure 4.16. The Complex Plane View after Estimator Subtraction of Mod-
ied 8PSK Signal for C-SNR = [0, 5, 10, 15] dB.
Figure 4.17. The Complex Plane View after Estimator Subtraction of 16QAM
Signal for C-SNR = [0, 5, 10, 15] dB.
complex plane, STA-3 would likely confuse it with QPSK. Any attempted demodulation of
modified 8PSK with a QPSK algorithm will produce excessive errors.
16QAM
Depictions of 1000 random 16QAM symbols for each C-SNR 0, 5, 10, and 15 dB are
shown in Figure 4.17. The 16QAM embedded signal at C-SNR = 0 dB appears as if the
radar signal is subject only to random noise; however, as the C-SNR increases, more order
appears within the signal. At C-SNR = 5 dB, we can discern edges in the complex plane.
At C-SNR = 10 dB, the received signal appears as a box. By C-SNR = 15 dB, the clusters
we would expect for a 16QAM signal are unmistakable.
Qualitatively covertness was lost when the C-SNR at STA-3 is 5 dB for all modulations
studied except 8PSK. The 8PSK modulation appeared covert until C-SNR reached 10 dB.
Themodified 8PSK loses some of its covertness for C-SNR ≥ 5 dB; however, it masquerades
as a QPSK signal.
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CHAPTER 5:
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude our work and indicate future opportunities for research in this
exciting field.
5.1 Conclusions
In this work, we proposed a half-duplex data link with the use of radar-embedded com-
munications and direct sequence spread spectrum. We concentrated on the design of the
downlink by embedding data into the radar pulse. With radar-data matched filter detection,
we showed an increase in PD compared to radar-pulse-only matched filter detection. We
showed that a downlink channel can be designed while simultaneously improving radar
PD performance. We verified that modulation schemes other than QPSK are possible to
demodulate even when embedded in a 20 dB stronger radar pulse. Specifically, the tech-
nique was shown to work with both amplitude and phase modulated signals. Rigorous
SER requirements can be met when using BPSK. The 8PSK modulation scheme provided
high data rates with good SER. The modified 8PSK (designed for LPI considerations) was
possible to demodulate, although the symbols were too closely spaced for stringent SER.
The 16QAM showed the possibility of high data rates with good SER. Finally, we analyzed
covertness in the complex plane (as parameterized by SNR in a non-cooperative receiver).
We showed, in the classic LPI eavesdropping scenario, C-SNR at STA-3’s receiver must
have a SNR of 0 dB for the communications to be covert and be less than 5 dB to preserve
some degree of covertness. When the embedded signal is viewed on a PPI display, it was
difficult to discriminate it from a non-embedded signal. We found as the C-SNR increased
at an eavesdropping receiver, the covertness of the signal decreased when viewed through
the complex plane.
5.2 Future Work
We believe there are four areas of this thesis that could use further research. First, investigate
taking a transmitted radar-communications signal and transitioning the true RF signal
into data messages on the EEMS laboratory network. This requires working hardware
43
detection and demodulation to encapsulate the data into the appropriate network protocols
for maritime network transmission. Second, we recommend further research into the
estimator size. The size of the estimator needed depends on a particular application and
is coupled with the SER and real-time requirements needed by that particular application.
A specific case study should be explored considering the maritime network that a radar
communicates to (specifically in the EEMS laboratory). The study of the estimator size
should focus on hardware constraints and reducing signal processing delay caused by an
over-sized estimator. This should also include howmuch of the communication-radar signal
should be used in the estimator, how many symbols to embed, and in what portion of the
pulse the symbols should be embedded (beginning, middle, end). This ties in nicely with the
requirement for data rate analysis for that particular case study mentioned above. Finally,
we recommend further investigation into analysis of the embedded communications as a
covert signal using quantitative metrics such as probability of intercept as opposed to the
qualitative analysis performed in this work.
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